Do Strict Trade Secret and Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation? by Graves, Charles Tait & Diboise, James A.
Do STRICT TRADE SECRET AND NON-
COMPETITION LAWS OBSTRUCT INNOVATION?
CHARLES TAIT GRAVES AND JAMES A. DIBOISE*
This Article examines whether non-competition covenants and
overbroad trade secret laws operate to restrict innovation and impede the
growth of small, creative businesses -especially those founded by former
employees of larger, established companies. We summarize the nascent
scholarship around these issues, and pose several questions for future
research by legal scholars and economists. We then critically analyze
aspects of non-competition, fiduciary duty, and trade secret law bodies of
law which we refer to as "the law of employee mobility. " We conclude that
reform in these areas would likely promote innovation, and we invite
further discussion around these important but neglected areas of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent do a given jurisdiction's trade secret, employee
mobility, and non-competition laws affect the success of a venture-backed
innovation community? We believe that a less restrictive regime in these
areas of law is more likely to foster the growth of entrepreneurial, creative
companies. That conclusion may seem counter-intuitive or even
controversial. After all, much of the mythology of intellectual property law
holds that strong laws protect inventors and foster innovation.1 We take the
opposite approach with respect to non-competition agreements, overbroad
trade secret rules, and other practices that make it difficult for creative
employees to quickly and easily change jobs.
In this article, we will outline our argument, describe the scholarly
debate on these issues, and comment briefly on six areas of law that may
impede local development of venture-financed technology companies. Our
experience as litigators who defend employees and start-up companies
targeted by former employers allows us to comment on how these doctrines
. Charles Tait Graves is an associate and James A. DiBoise is a partner at Wilson
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Professor Lawrence Lessig summarizes this mythology for patents: "If an inventor
can't get a patent, then he will have less incentive to invent. Without a patent, his idea
could simply be taken ..... If people could so easily free-ride, fewer would be
inventors. And if fewer were inventors, we would have less progress in 'science and
useful arts."' LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 205 (Vintage Books 2002).
Whether or not this holds true for patent law, we believe it certainly does not for overly
restrictive trade secret and employee mobility laws.
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unfold in actual practice, and to illustrate the overreaching and unfairness
that often results.
Employee mobility-or the ease by which a skilled employee can
leave one job, join another company, and immediately apply his or her
skills-is a necessary ingredient of a successful venture-backed business
region. Almost by definition, small and creative start-up companies funded
by venture capital are short-lived and require the ready availability of
skilled founders and employees. The structure of innovation communities
is one of multiplicity and speed-numerous small efforts racing to meet
common goals, without direction from above. The structure is not one
where a small number of large, hierarchical, and long-established
companies maintain a monopoly over local talent.
But in too many jurisdictions in the United States, archaic non-
competition rules sideline employees who seek to resign from one company
and found or join another. It is astonishing that courts in twenty-first
century America still apply restrictive covenants developed to control
laborers in feudal England in order to prevent skilled technical employees
from joining the company of their choice, and thus slowing innovation. In
turn, overly restrictive trade secret rules operate as court-created non-
competition agreements and all too easily allow former employers to bury a
new start-up in legal fees and amorphous, ever-changing accusations of
trade secret theft.
We are not alone in questioning whether restrictions on employee
mobility, enforced in the name of protecting existing businesses, operate to
harm the overall economy of a given jurisdiction by inhibiting the spread of
venture-backed start-up companies. In recent years, a number of scholars
have begun studying the relative success of innovation communities, with a
focus on their respective legal regimes. In this article, we will outline this
scholarship, and then outline several areas of law where trade secret and
non-competition rules appear overly-restrictive, or too readily abused by
lawyers who seek to impede employee mobility and start-up enterprises. At
the same time, we will outline the debate on these issues, including
challenges posed by defenders of the traditional restrictive regime. We will
then indicate areas where we believe further research by economists and
legal scholars might be useful to test the effects of restrictive employee
mobility rules.
Our argument should not be taken as reductive-we do not argue
that merely abandoning archaic restrictions on employee mobility alone
would necessarily result in the formation of more innovative businesses.
The legal regime is only one possible factor affecting the relative success of
a given entrepreneurial community. Other factors may ultimately prove
more important-such as proximity to top-notch universities, meritocratic
openness to immigrants and a diverse employee base, and the social status
accorded to creators and innovators. All the same, a legal structure that
promotes competition and employee mobility must surely open more
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possibilities than do restrictive rules descended from feudal England and
the age of factory labor and applied without regard to whether they best
meet contemporary needs.
II. THE EFFICACY OF EMPLOYEE MOBILITY RULES: THE
SCHOLARLY DEBATE
The proliferation of technology-based businesses has led many
thinkers to reconsider intellectual property laws created in a different social
and economic environment-often that of the nineteenth century or before.
Attorneys and law professors have questioned whether such rules best
promote innovation and whether they provide a proper balance between the
employees who create new ideas and the companies who provide the
resources for the development of those ideas. This discussion is part of a
wider debate over restrictive intellectual property rules, beyond trade secret
law.2 Some thinkers, such as Eben Moglen of Columbia Law School,
criticize the entire structure of intellectual property jurisprudence for its
tendency to centralize the control of information. Others, such as
Catherine Fisk of Duke, advocate redrawing the rules to better protect and
benefit employee-inventors.4
Still others focus on reforming the existing trade secret and non-
competition systems by comparing the legal regimes governing different
innovation communities. That narrower discussion, one of many current
debates regarding the efficacy of various intellectual property rules, is the
focus of this article.
By the mid-1990s, California's Silicon Valley had pulled ahead of
Boston's Route 128 as the more successful innovation community. The
former had, since the 1960s, become the incubator to rhizomatic networks
of rapidly proliferating start-up companies. The latter, by contrast,
experienced some similar success but remained more wedded to the big
company model. This led two prominent scholars, Professors Ronald
Gilson of Stanford and Annalee Saxenian of Berkeley, to publish separate
analyses of possible reasons for the disparity. Both theorized that Silicon
Valley's success was related to the tendency of skilled employees to move
2 For a summary of various conceptions of the "public domain" offered by different
commentators in these debates, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L. J. 783 (2006). For our purposes here, the "public
domain" means information a former employee can freely use after departing.
3 See Lisa Lerer, 'DotCommunist'Protects Free Softnare Frontier, THE RECORDER,
Feb. 21, 2006, at 3 (profile of Moglen describing his call for the "abolition of all
intellectual property laws" and his promotion of free software projects).
4 See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 839, 862-63 (2005) (calling for the replacement of current invention
assignment rules with a system that gives employee-inventors a credit in the form of a
sort ofjoint ownership).
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from company to company, and to more easily apply the knowledge they
developed along the way.5
Professor Gilson focused more explicitly on jurisprudential
differences between California, which has barred non-competition
agreements by statute since 1872, and Massachusetts, which permits non-
competition covenants. He argued that California's statute had the probably
unintended consequence of making job-hopping easier, and thus promoting
6
a community of entrepreneurial technology start-up companies.
Challenging the common belief that strong intellectual property laws are
necessary to promote economic growth, Professor Gilson used the term
"knowledge spillovers" to describe the dissemination of information and
experience that results from employee mobility and argued that such
spillovers form a necessary constituent of Silicon Valley's success.7 Some
degree of information-sharing between companies spurs innovation,
because innovation rarely takes place in a vacuum, apart from an
infrastructure that promotes it.8
Following Gilson and Saxenian, another commentator has
described how former employers can use other legal theories-such as
antitrust and tortious interference lawsuits-in the same manner as trade
secret and non-competition laws to stifle the employee mobility that
appears to contribute to successful technology regions. 9
If these theories are correct, the legal implications are of vast
importance. There appears to be consensus across the political spectrum
that the economy is ever more knowledge-based, and that an individual
employee's intellectual talents matter far more than in the past.' 0 If a given
5 See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 31-37, 41, 60-78 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)
(examining differences between Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128, including the
freer flow of information); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594-619 (1999) (attributing Silicon Valley's relative
success to a less restrictive trade secret and employee mobility legal regime).
'See Gilson, supra note 5, at 607-09 (discussing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600).
7 See id at 621. Another scholar has published a detailed study indicating that
information is widely disseminated among Silicon Valley employees, regardless of
trade secret laws. See Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of
Normative Failures: Divulging of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 105.
' See Gilson, supra note 5.
9 See Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm: Emerging Legal Alternatives
to the Non-Compete Agreement and Their Potential Effect on Developing High-
Technology Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 135 (2001) (noting various legal
theories used to limit employee mobility in West Coast high-tech regions).
10 See Fisk, supra note 4, at 857 ("Virtually every observer from every possible
perspective agrees that changes in the economy of industrial and post-industrial nations
and the world as a whole have increased the importance of intellectual capital ....
Compared to fifty years ago, even those who still sell or manufacture things (as opposed
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jurisdiction applies strict non-competition and trade secret laws in the name
of protecting innovation, it may be harming both employees and employers
on the whole.
Not all scholars agree, though none has published an extensive
rebuttal to Gilson or Saxenian. Perhaps the most important and thoughtful
challenge to Gilson's theory regarding non-competition clauses was one by
Jason Wood. Wood noted that venture financing and start-up success was
also prevalent in regions where non-competition clauses are legal, such as
Austin, Texas, and North Carolina's Research Triangle, and not just in
Silicon Valley."' Thus, Wood suggests, Professor Gilson may have
attributed undue importance to the absence of non-competition agreements
in Silicon Valley.' 2 At the same time, Wood seems to accept the more
general theory that "knowledge spillovers" provide economic benefits, and
notes that employers in places like Austin may not have actually applied or
enforced non-competition clauses during the period in question.13 In other
words, the fact that a jurisdiction allows non-competition clauses itself
provides no data as to whether employers actually use and enforce them.
Our own experience regarding Texas high-tech employees suggests that at
least some prominent Texas employers do not use non-competition
agreements, perhaps because, as Wood suggests, they are a hindrance in
attracting skilled employees.
Other commentators seem unaware of the current debate and offer
arguments in favor of non-competition and trade secret rules with little
basis in the everyday reality of start-up formation and employee mobility
litigation. Forbes Magazine, for example, argued polemically in 2004 that
non-competition clauses are "a boon to the economy" according to
"economic theory. 1 4 The only theory offered, however, was an assertion
that non-competition clauses allow employers to invest in skilled
employees 5 -assuming that most employers actually provide training to
highly skilled employees in the first place, and that those who do would not
do so if non-competition clauses were unavailable.
to knowledge) spend a greater proportion of dollars per unit of output on knowledge
than they do on raw materials or labor.").
I See Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants not to Compete
and Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH.
14 (2000), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue3/v5i3a14-Wood.html.
12 See id.
13 See id. (noting that during the boom time at issue, highly-skilled employees had
greater bargaining power with prospective employers, which could explain why some
employers choose not to use non-competition covenants).
14 See Dan Seligman, The Case for Servitude, FORBES MAGAZINE, March 1, 2004, at 70.
15 See id. We contacted the Hoover Institution scholar quoted in the article, David
Henderson, soon after the article appeared to find out about any economic studies
justifying noncompete covenants. To our knowledge, it does not appear that any such
studies exist.
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Another example, focused on trade secret law, argued that even if
there is some "social gain" when a "thief' takes "trade secrets," such free
flow of information is "offset" by a claimed "reduction in the incentive to
invent., 16 This article, by three Law and Economics thinkers, makes the
serious error of assuming that trade secret litigation typically involves a
secret previously known to the employer, zealously guarded, and stolen by
a conscious wrongdoer to avoid the costs of development. To the contrary,
and as we will describe in more detail below, much trade secret litigation
involves "secrets" drawn up after the fact by the plaintiffs lawyers, on the
borderline between what may be secret and what may be the employee's
general skills and knowledge (if not entirely non-secret), and used by the
former employee because he or she believed it to be non-secret.
This bias-assuming that employers only sue to protect legitimate
secrets, and that trade secret law is something akin to the penal law-is all
too common among those who defend the existing legal regime. The bias
can affect calls for reform. Two commentators recognize the problems that
non-competition agreements pose for mobile employees, but suggest that
courts appoint referees to determine the proper length of non-competition
clauses-apparently the proper length would be the date when the
information known to the former employer becomes stale.' This approach
does nothing to alleviate problems for mobile employees or address the
issues raised by Professor Gilson and others, and seems to place primary
importance on protecting the former employer from competition.
We take issue with the concept that protecting an employer from
competition by its former employees should be the primary aim of state
trade secret and employee mobility regimes. We believe that Professor
Gilson and others who have critiqued overbroad non-competition and trade
secret restrictions are likely correct in their assessment, and that promoting
innovation means rethinking the legal rules that snare mobile employees in
almost every state. If, as it seems, employee mobility is a key ingredient in
the formation of successful innovation communities,18 restrictions that
irrationally limit employee mobility must be called into question.
16 See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 69-70 (1991).
17 See Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor l11, The Business Fallout from the Rapid
Obsolescence and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Product: Downsizing of
Noncompetition Agreementss, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 3 (2005), available at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume-6&article-3.
18 It may well be that widespread employee mobility is a feature of any period of
innovation and growth in technological development, anywhere in the world. See, e.g.,
Don Lee, Job Hopping is Rampant as China's Economy Chases Skilled Workers, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Cl (describing widespread employee mobility in
China's dynamic economic sectors).
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III. THE LEGAL REGIME OF EMPLOYEE MOBILITY: CONTESTED RULES
AND ARCHAIC RESTRICTIONS
We have outlined the scholarly debate as a background to discuss
six areas of trade secret and employee mobility law whose rules may impact
the success of a venture-financed high-tech community.
Our contribution to this debate comes from our experience litigating and
counseling mobile employees and creative start-up companies. We have
seen firsthand, and repeatedly, the types of problems overbroad trade secret
rules can have-to say nothing of non-competition covenants, which often
prevent inventive people from starting or joining the business they desire.
We believe that there are several areas of law in need of reform, and that a
given jurisdiction should enact reforms if it wishes to better promote
innovation.
Specifically, there are at least six areas of law where restrictions on
employee mobility likely impede the development of entrepreneurial
communities. Three of these involve the law of contract and fiduciary duty:
non-competition covenants, non-solicitation covenants, and the ability of a
fiduciary to "prepare to compete" before resigning from his or her current
company. Three involve trade secret law: the "inevitable disclosure"
doctrine, judicial skepticism towards frequently-altered secrecy claims, and
several procedural tactics used against former employees. We will discuss
each in turn.
A. Non-Competition Covenants
Perhaps no restriction on employee mobility more inhibits the
success of venture-backed innovation communities than non-competition
covenants, and perhaps none is as difficult to justify. The persistence of
non-competition covenants into our era, long after the age of lifetime
employment has ended and when one's skills are one's best guarantee of
success, seems to serve only narrow interests at the wider society's expense.
That non-competition covenants still exist and are so widely applied brings
to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes's maxim that
It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and
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the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. ' 9
A non-competition covenant is a term in an employment contract
that forbids the employee from joining a competitive business within a
specified amount of time after leaving the current employer. It is, in short,
a post-employment prohibition that bars the employee from what may be
his or her most productive use of skills, knowledge, and experience. Non-
competition clauses are almost always boilerplate form contracts, and job
applicants usually have little or no ability to negotiate their terms. Twelve
months is, in our experience, the most common time period listed in such
covenants.
Historically, courts limited the application of non-competition
covenants to specific regions, and have consistently refused to apply
covenants that seek to impose multi-year limitations. Courts have also
struck down blatant attempts to vest ownership of a person's post-
resignation inventions in the former employer. But these minor limitations
matter little in today's economy, where businesses have nationwide
operation, and where a one-year limit may force an employee to avoid
joining a company where his or her skills will best be used, and where he or
she may find the most favorable compensation. A one-year non-
competition covenant is a substantial limitation on a skilled employee
looking to find the most productive and innovative position available, and
on venture-backed enterprises seeking to hire the best available local talent.
We believe that if American courts were considering the imposition
of non-competition covenants afresh, and without the weight of history,
such covenants would be rejected for their unfairness, their impositions
upon individuals' livelihoods, and their likely harm to the overall economy.
As it stands, jurisdictions that affirm non-competition covenants are, in
effect, applying the rules of a vastly different era to today's economy,
without regard to whether doing so makes sense.
Indeed, it seems difficult to dispute the feudal, archaic nature of
such covenants, and their origins in an age where laborers had few rights
and innovation was not a major part of the economy. It appears that non-
competition covenants arose in England to protect local guild monopolies
and, as the industrial age dawned, to regulate the labor market.20 Non-
19 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV 457, 469 (1897)
(referring to an archaic aspect of real property law) (reprinted at
http://www.4lawschool.com/lib/pathoflaw.shtml).
20 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
629-37 (1960) (describing early English case law and development of non-competition
agreements, which were based on protecting guilds and later on regulating the labor
market); KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 71-76, 104-05 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(describing the medieval hierarchy of labor in feudal England and its transmission into
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competition clauses were just one of a universe of legal devices English law
used by the late 1700s to restrict employee and apprentice mobility.2' The
sense one gets is that stronger parties and their judicial allies in England
used the covenants and other measures to prevent competition and ensure
that already-established businesses had an unfair advantage over
newcomers and would-be market entrants. This imbalance of power is not
surprising for that period of English history; the concept of the creative
entrepreneur seems nascent at best. Blackstone himself defended a non-
competition restriction on the ground that an employee's labor is a form of
property, owned by the employer. When describing a cause of action for
enticing an employee away from his employer, he noted that:
The reason and foundation upon which all
this doctrine is built, seems to be the
property that every man has in the service
of his domestics; acquired by the contract
of hiring, and vouchsafed by giving them
22
wages.
The point of describing this somewhat embarrassing history is to
highlight the origins of non-competition covenants in a vastly different
time, one remote from the contemporary American economy. The very
suggestion that an employer has a property interest in its employees is
offensive, but that may well have been the original justification for such
contracts.
The problems with non-competition agreements are easy to
understand. An inventive employee feels unproductive at a hierarchical,
slow-moving company. He wants to start a new company to pursue new
inventions. But his employer included a boilerplate non-competition
covenant in his employment contract, and he is sidelined for a year from
any activity that his employer might deem competitive. He must instead
pursue a business less suited to his talents, or in which he has less
experience. Waiting for one year means a wasted period, and few, if any,
employees have the means to do nothing for a year before launching a
competitive business. The former employer thus retains a monopoly in the
field, or at least reduces the number of competitors.
nineteenth century, early industrial American law through non-competition covenants
and other restrictions; "the hierarchical relation of master and servant in nineteenth-
century America was a remnant of the larger system of hierarchies that historically had
extended up and down medieval society.").
21 See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 137-40 (Edwin Cannon ed.,
The Modern Library 1937) (1776) (discussing numerous then-existing restrictions on
workers and apprentices).
22 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 417
(University of Chicago Press 1979) (1769).
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The problem worsens with the size and scope of the former
employer's business. When giant multinational corporations with a wide
range of business and research interests use broadly-worded non-
competition agreements to bind their skilled employees, the range of
forbidden activities is theoretically enormous.
Microsoft is one example.23 When an employee seeks to leave
Microsoft to form an inventive new start-up, he or she probably has no idea
of the full range of Microsoft's global research and inventive efforts.
Should a former Microsoft employee in Washington State be bound not to
compete with Microsoft if Microsoft employees in China or Europe held a
brainstorming meeting and thought about research in the same area that the
former employee wants to pursue in her own business? What if the
employee sets out in a line of business that he believes is not competitive to
Microsoft, only to find that the company in some remote office-
unbeknownst to him-is working on the same idea? More to the point,
what is one of the world's most powerful companies, and one once pursued
by the U.S. government for antitrust violations, doing using non-
competition covenants to stop its employees from pursuing innovation
outside the company, and why should the judiciary allow Microsoft to do
so?24
Our critique of non-competition covenants encompasses not just
those that expressly bar competition for a certain period of time, but also
those purportedly "narrow" covenants that extract a financial penalty to
scare the employee away from future competition. 25  The range of such
penalty clauses seems limitless; in extreme cases, some employers have
even required employees to pledge that their employer will own anything
they create for a set period of time after they resign.26
We question the philosophical justification, if there is one, for a
legal doctrine that favors one business over another merely because the
first-in-time business forced its employees to sign away their right to
23 We have participated in advising several groups of individuals who sought to leave
Microsoft and were bound by non-competition covenants. In each case, the employees
faced the problem of not even knowing whether Microsoft might potentially be
competitive in a certain technical area because the company is so far-flung.
24 One Microsoft non-competition covenant dispute was widely reported in 2005. Kai-
Fu Lee, a Microsoft employee bound by a non-competition clause, joined Google, and
litigation resulted. See Ina Fried, Microsoft Sies Over Google Hire, CNET News, July
22, 2005, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+sues+over+Google+hire/2100-1014 3-
5795051 .html.
25 For a well-known example struck down by a California court, see Muggill v. Reuben
H. Donnelley Corp., 42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 108-09 (1965) (voiding clause that ended
pension payments if former employee joined competitor under California law).
26 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 895 (N.J. 1988) (refusing to apply
holdover clause on reasonableness grounds); Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F.
Supp. 273, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (voiding holdover invention assignment clause as an
impermissible non-competition agreement under California law).
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compete. We see no principled reason why being the first to pursue an idea
in a given jurisdiction should bar those who work for that first business
from setting out to pursue the same general idea with a new and different
enterprise. And while some argue that non-competition covenants prevent
trade secret misappropriation, this is somewhat like arguing that the way to
prevent traffic accidents is to prohibit automobiles. Punishing the entire
class of would-be competitors to prevent a few from taking trade secrets is
wildly overbroad and serves only those who seek to prevent even entirely
lawful competition.
As noted above, California bars non-competition agreements
outright, with two minor exceptions, 27 and some other states make such
contracts difficult to enforce.2 8 But most states permit non-competition
covenants lasting one year or less. Ohio is one state that permits former
employers to broadly restrict their former employees,2 9 and we believe that
such rules are a serious obstacle to the development of a venture-backed
innovation community.
It is very likely that barring non-competition covenants-as
California has done-would result in tangible economic benefits in addition
to providing more freedoms for former employees. Two companies
working on the same problem are more likely to result in the best possible
solution. Consumers are more likely to find price benefits from increased
competition. More companies working in a field are likely to spin off more
ideas and inventions as they pursue their primary goals than one company
is.
It should be obvious from our comments that we believe non-
competition agreements are an archaic holdover from a different and less
open economic model-a time when large landowners and factory owners
held all the power, and small innovative companies were not a prominent
part of the economy. Legislative action to abolish non-competition
agreements may be unlikely, though it is not out of the question.
27 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (1997) (sale of the goodwill or corporate
shares); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (1997) (partnership arrangements).
28 See, e.g., NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 251 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding non-
competition covenant void as a matter of Louisiana public policy).
29 See UZ Eng. Prod. Co. v. Midwest Mtr. Supply Co., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1080-81
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (upholding an overbroad, two-year non-competition and non-
solicitation covenant to prevent competition in the "small parts" trade; court went so far
as to assert that "an employer has a legitimate interest in preventing a former employee
from using the skill, experience, training, and confidential information the former
employee has acquired during the employee's tenure with his employer in a manner
advantageous to a competitor in attracting business, regardless whether it was an
already established customer of the former employer.") (emphasis added).
30 It would seem that state legislators from both parties would be amenable to the
abolition of non-competition clauses; support for intellectual property reform need not
split down party lines. Promoting employee mobility both benefits employees, which
may appeal more to Democrats, and helps promote entrepreneurial businesses, which
334 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 1:2
JOURNAL
Employees with bargaining power can refuse to sign them, intelligent
business owners who recognize that the gains from employee mobility
outweigh narrower concerns can refuse to apply them, and attorneys can
mount new and creative challenges to these obsolete shackles on
innovation.
B. Non-Solicitation Covenants
Non-solicitation covenants are closely related to non-competition
covenants and pose similar problems. Non-solicitation covenants are a
more specific type of non-competition clause which typically bar (1)
contacting any of the former employer's customers for a certain period of
time, usually one year, and/or (2) hiring or attempting to hire a former co-
worker, or even encouraging a former co-worker to change jobs, usually for
one year.
Non-solicitation covenants are broader than trade secret restrictions
because they prohibit a former employee from making contact with
individuals regardless of whether the former employer claims those
individuals' identities as trade secrets. In other words, even if a customer is
not the former employer's trade secret, a non-solicitation covenant prevents
a former employee from initiating contact with that non-secret customer for
its business.
As to the non-solicitation of customers, such covenants are
monopolistic and overreaching. What if the customer would prefer to do
business with the former employee, or at least seek a competing price
quote, but does not know that the former employee has resigned and started
a new business? Something is amiss when consenting businesses cannot
transact business together, merely because another business got there first.
As with non-competition covenants generally, such contracts appear to
restrict competitive activities that might lower prices, provide better
services for customers, and allow businesses to partner together where that
might be most productive.
As is so often the case, California has taken the lead in abolishing
such contracts. A 2003 decision voided a non-solicitation clause to the
extent it prevented a former employee from calling on non-secret customers
of the former employer.31
As to non-competition covenants that bar the solicitation of one's
former co-workers, the restriction on innovation is apparent.
Entrepreneurial start-up companies are often founded by groups of friends
may appeal more to Republicans. No doubt powerful companies which use non-
competition covenants would lobby against reform, but a principled argument in
defense of non-competition contracts seems difficult to muster.
31 See Thompson v. impaxx, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 427, 429-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(voiding customer non-solicitation clause in employment contract to the extent it barred
contacts with non-secret customers).
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who have worked together elsewhere. If a company founder cannot contact
his or her former co-workers-people whom he or she may work best with,
and whose common efforts would be the most creative-the only
beneficiary is the former employer. In many cases where employees would
respond to an invitation to leave, the former employer is in decline, is too
hierarchical, offers too little financial reward for employee-inventors, or its
management simply treats employees badly. Covenants that prevent a
friend from calling his or her former co-workers to solicit them for a better-
paying, more rewarding opportunity in favor of an unproductive or slow-
moving employer seem to have no rational basis other than sheer favoritism
towards established businesses. 32 We believe that unless such solicitation is
accomplished using some unlawful means, contracts that bar the contacting
of one's former co-workers should be rejected.
C. Preparing to Compete
Another legal area where lessened restrictions may promote the
growth of creative new companies is the law regarding a departing
fiduciary's preparations to compete with his or her principal. Many start-up
businesses are founded by individuals who were officers or directors at their
previous jobs, and thus owed fiduciary duties. Fiduciaries, of course, owe
greater duties than do ordinary employees. 33 The legal question is the
degree to which a fiduciary can plan the next venture before actually
resigning without violating his or her fiduciary obligations.
Unlike the law of non-competition agreements, the "preparing to
compete" case law has largely been favorable for fiduciaries planning a new
company before resigning. Although the cases are few and scattered, courts
have held that fiduciaries may, before resigning, organize infrastructure for
the next business, 34 file incorporation papers, 35 and seek financing. 36 They
32 Recent cases involving co-worker non-solicitation covenants include Hay Group, Inc.
v. Bassick, No. 02 C 8194, 2005 WL 2420415, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005) (striking
down covenant as overbroad given plaintiffs global business); Palmer & Cay v.
Lockton Cos., Inc., 615 S.E.2d 752, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding covenant).
33 There generally is no restriction, for example, on groups of employees getting
together before resignation to make a plan to leave and form a new company. See, e.g.,
ATC Distr. Group, Inc. v. Whatever it Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700,
716 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[Plaintiff] offers no explanation why ordinary employees of a
company may not meet with each other, openly or 'clandestinely,' to plan for the
opening of a rival company for which they would rather work."); The Fitness
Experience, Inc. v. TFC Fitness Equip, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892-93 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of employees who had made preparations
to compete before resigning by making plans, meeting with "insurance agents, realtors,
and lawyers," and possibly a de minimis use of a company phone). The more difficult
question involves a fiduciary's latitude to engage in similar pre-resignation activities.
34 See Midwest Janitorial Supply Corp. v. Greenwood, 629 N.W.2d 371, 374-75 (Iowa
2001) (permissible preparation activities included contacting a realtor about warehouse
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may also announce their plans to others, so long as they do not engage in
solicitation. 3' The latter point can be dangerous, because fiduciaries
planning to leave often develop the plan in discussions with friends from
work. The law is not as well-developed as it should be regarding the
differences between developing a plan with friends and issuing a
solicitation to potential customers or other co-workers. At least one court
has noted that the former is permissible, and we agree that it should be,
including for fiduciaries. 3
The areas where fiduciaries get into trouble when planning new
companies are predictable-inventing new technologies that relate to the
employer's business, or making substantial use of company resources to
space, looking into phone system pricing, arranging for signs, and looking into
computer hardware ); Mercer Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 F. Supp. 219, 234-
35 (D.D.C. 1996); Dwyer, Costello and Knox, P.C. v. Diak, 846 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (permissible to rent office space and print stationary before resigning);
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 570-71 (Md. Ct. App. 1978)
(permissible to consult with a state business commission, file a bank application for a
loan to purchase equipment, contact the power company regarding power for the
equipment, and sign a contract to purchase important equipment).
35 See Instrument Repair Serv., Inc. v. Gunby, 518 S.E.2d 161, 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(permissible to incorporate new competitive business before resignation); Venture
Express, Inc. v. Zilly, 973 S.W.2d 602, 606 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Fletcher,
Barnhardt & White, Inc. v. Matthews, 397 S.E.2d 81, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (initial
steps to form new company before resignation permitted); Zemitzsch, Inc. v. Harrison,
712 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (permissible to incorporate new company
before resigning); Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc. v. Remmert, 531 P.2d 428, 432-33 (Kan.
1975) (same).
36 See Greenwood, 629 N.W.2d at 374-75 (permissible to seek line of credit for next
company); Maryland Metals, 382 A.2d at 570-71 (permissible to contact a potential
investor in next company).
37 See The New L&N Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. Menaged, No. CIV.A.97 4966, 1998 WL
575270, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1998) (permissible to schedule an appointment with a
customer for a date after the fiduciary's resignation); Wilde, 920 F. Supp. at 235
(permissible to invite other employees to a dinner to solicit them where the date of the
invitation was set for a date after resignation); McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d
980, 983-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (permissible to give 30 days' notice and send a letter
to the employer's customers announcing the resignation); Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 551
A.2d 947, 949 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (permissible to use non-secret patient list before
leaving, give notice, and send letters to patients before resignation); Harrison, 712
S.W.2d at 422 (permissible to tell employer's customer before resignation of plan to
form new company); Ellis & Marshall Assoc., Inc. v. Marshall, 306 N.E.2d 712, 717
(Ill. Ct. App. 1974) (permissible to inform coworkers and employer's customers of plan
to resign and form competing entity).
31 See Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 510-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
("The employee has no general duty to disclose his plans and may secretly join with
other employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to the employer.")
(affirming jury verdict of no solicitation where, among other things, other employees
initiated contact with defendant).
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work on the next business. 39 But like all employees, fiduciaries may re-use
non-secret information after resigning. 40
Preparing to compete, then, is an area where the courts have been
sympathetic to departing fiduciaries-a sympathy that promotes innovation.
Courts need to be made aware of these favorable decisions so that a uniform
set of rules can be developed to prevent overbroad or frivolous lawsuits
against departing fiduciaries.
D. Trade Secret Law: Rejecting "Inevitable Disclosure"
Trade secret law under the Uniform Trade Secret Act ("UTSA")
offers a somewhat balanced approach to the use of nonpublic information
by former employees, but trade secret law in practice is quite different from
trade secret law on paper. It is the manner with which trade secret lawsuits
are litigated, rather than the laws as written, that poses the greater threat to
innovation communities. We have seen far too many start-ups targeted by a
former employer and then harassed with overbroad and ever-changing sets
of trade secret accusations-with little understanding or intervention by the
courts overseeing the cases. We offer comments on three aspects of trade
secret law in practice, then, to discuss how the law as practiced can impede
innovation, and to offer arguments for litigators who defend inventive and
mobile employees.
The single biggest threat to innovation under trade secret law is the
so-called "inevitable disclosure" theory-a former employer's request for
an injunction to stop a former employer from even working for a
competitor, on the ground that trade secrets might be used. An "inevitable
disclosure" injunction is a court-created, after-the-fact non-competition
39 Riggs Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Columbia Partners, LLC, 966 F. Supp. 1250, 1265
(D.D.C. 1997) (impermissible to use secret information and, before resigning, to solicit
coworkers). See Golden Eagle/Satellite Archery, Inc. v. Epling, 665 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170
(N.Y. App. 1997) (impermissible to use company resources to develop product for
which defendant later sought patent); Daniel Orifice Co. v. Whalen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659,
665-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (impermissible to create detailed specifications of
improvements to the plaintiffs product during off-hours, and to resign and sell the ideas
through a new company). See Alexander & Alexander Benefits Servs., Inc. v. Benefit
Brokers & Consultants, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (D. Or. 1991) (impermissible to
make extensive use of company time and resources to organize a new company).
40 See Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79, 83 (9th Cir. 1962) (fiduciary
created list of potential customers from public sources in plaintiffs service, and then re-
created the list from same sources after resignation); see also Numed, Inc. v. McNutt,
724 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. App. 1987) (permissible to use non-secret information
learned from the former principal for next venture); Public Relations Aids, Inc. v.
Wagner, 324 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. App. 1971) (former fiduciary permitted to use
information that was "ingenious" but non-secret); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A.
Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723, 731 (Mass. App. 1970) (being a former fiduciary
"did not make information, otherwise properly acquired, confidential.").
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covenant that penalizes a former employee who has not actually
misappropriated anything. Like written non-competition contracts, an
"inevitable disclosure" injunction favors the first-in-time business over its
new competitor.
We have seen how "inevitable disclosure" lawsuits operate. In all
or most such cases, the former employer's attorneys find out that the
employee has formed or joined a competitor, and then paint the former
employee as a dishonest thief in public court papers. We have seen trade
secret accusations based on information to which the former employee
never even had access, or that the former employer had already placed in
the public domain. In many cases the former employee simply sought a
more desirable job, a better chance to invent, and greater compensation to
support his or her family. In some cases the former employee has already
moved to a different city or state to join the new employer, only to face a
court proceeding that might sideline him or her. The result is uncertainty
and fear at being defamed as a would-be misappropriator-something the
former employer accomplishes without even having to present evidence of
wrongdoing.
As with non-competition agreements, we believe that courts should
reject the "inevitable disclosure" theory out of hand as an overbroad
restriction. If a former employer has an opportunity to prevent an employee
from competing without any evidence of wrongdoing, and can do so merely
by hiring attorneys to attack the employee and file injunction papers, then
the law disfavors innovation and employee mobility.
The theory has a long history dating back to 1897,41 though the
label "inevitable disclosure" appears to be a fairly recent development.
42California has long rejected the theory, but a notorious Seventh Circuit
decision in 1995 gave it new life elsewhere.43  Courts continue to issue
inconsistent rulings when faced with "inevitable disclosure" requests for
injunctions.4 4 We can only hope that courts will think carefully about the
implications of such injunctions when ruling on them.
41 See Catherine Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 441, 507 (2001) (noting origins of the "inevitable disclosure" theory in the late
nineteenth century and citing decisions such as 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72
N.W. 140 (Mich. 1897)).
42 See Cont'l Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 148 P.2d 9, 11 (Cal. 1944) (early case
rejecting theory before it was called "inevitable disclosure"); Whyte v. Schlage Lock
Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 277, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting "inevitable disclosure"
under California law).
4, See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
44 See Dexxon Digital Storage, Inc. v. Haenszel, 832 N.E.2d 62, 68-69 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005) (mechanically applying theory without any discussion of its merits); Liebert
Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 927-29 (I1. Ct. App. 2005) (applying theory, but on
evidence that defendant had actually taken secret material); LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors,
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E. Trade Secret Law: Skepticism Toward Alteration of Secrecy
Claims
A second and more general issue in trade secret law is the problem
of overbroad and frequently-changing sets of trade secret claims. We see
far too many trade secret lawsuits where the plaintiff-through indifference
or as a deliberate tactic-buries its "real" trade secret claims in a wider set
of concepts that are demonstrably non-secret. This forces the defendant,
which is often a tiny start-up, to hire expensive experts to conduct research
merely to reduce the overbreadth of the plaintiffs claims.
A related problem, and one that is a feature of most trade secret
lawsuits, is the plaintiffs ability to alter its trade secret claims with ease, so
that the defendant is forever fighting a moving target. We have seen cases
where the defendant is able to rebut the original set of claims, and the
plaintiff then changes course and alleges a second, completely different set
of trade secret claims. In one case, the plaintiff switched from customer
list-based claims to technology claims, and in another the plaintiff switched
from hardware-based trade secret claims to software-based claims. In both
cases, the defendant spent time and money to show the weaknesses in the
first set of claims, and then had to start over again. In both cases, the
plaintiff was a powerful and well-established company, and the defendant
was a small, venture-backed start-up.
We believe these problems occur because courts do not recognize
that plaintiffs trade secret claims are too often created after the fact by
attorneys to try to trap a former employee, and not so valuable that the
plaintiff had previously recorded them as company intellectual property and
guarded them as secret before the employee departed. Courts should
recognize that trade secret claims-the only form of intellectual property
that is not written down and registered with the government in advance,
unlike copyrights, trademarks, or patents-are too easily manipulated by
those seeking to restrict lawful competition.
There are two things courts can do (and that litigators can ask
courts to do) to address this problem. One is concrete, and one is abstract.
First, courts should follow the lead of a recent California court and require
that trade secret plaintiffs show "good cause" to add new trade secret claims
mid-stream. 45 Trade secret plaintiffs should not be permitted to freely alter
and add claims, especially once discovery is nearing its close.
Second, courts can better express skepticism towards trade secrecy
claims by recognizing that trade secrets are intellectual property rights that
Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 476 (Md. App. 2004) ("inevitable disclosure" not the law in
Maryland).
45 See Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (requiring good cause to amend trade secret claim identification under California
statute).
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extend only so far as the property right, rather than semi-feudal obligations
that attach to an employee even if the trade secret claims are weak. Some
view trade secret law as a set of obligations by a former employee to avoid
using any information learned from a former employer. The property-based
approach, by contrast, allows the former employee to defeat the claim by
defeating the property right-such as by demonstrating that the information
is known to the trade and thus free for him or her to use.
In short, we believe that recognizing that former employers often
make overbroad trade secret claims and alter them frequently as an
anticompetitive tactic is important when developing legal practices that
favor the growth of creative enterprises.
F. Trade Secret Law. Procedural Requirements
We turn to three procedural issues as a final critique of trade secret
practices that restrict innovation: (1) whether a trade secret plaintiff must
actually spell out its trade secret claims in detail so that courts and the
defendant know what is at issue; (2) whether the forty-plus jurisdictions
under the Uniform Trade Secret Act should use that statute to preempt
obsolete common law claims aimed at departing employees; and (3)
whether trade secret plaintiffs should be able to use litigation protective
orders to prevent the accused defendant from learning what information he
or she is accused of already knowing and stealing.
As to the identification of trade secret claims, the problem is that
trade secret plaintiffs often seek to avoid disclosing the details of the
alleged trade secrets to prevent the defendant from raising the best possible
defenses. A defendant who does not know the exact details of the claims
cannot always point to public domain sources, prove independent
derivation, or prove his or her preexisting knowledge of the alleged secret.
In turn, a court cannot make an educated ruling on summary judgment if it
does not know what the claims are.
California is the only state with a statute that requires a trade secret
plaintiff to provide some identification of its claims before initiating
discovery. But even under that statute, a plaintiff need not provide an
absolutely specific identification of the alleged secrets, and thus the
defendant must seek a complete identification through interrogatories.
46
Some other jurisdictions require identification early in the case, and many
46 See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 826,
906-07 (2005) (interpreting California identification statute).
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now require identification as the case progresses. 47 But few courts demand
the exact precision necessary to accurately assess a plaintiffs claim against
information in the public domain, and few courts seem to recognize the
gamesmanship involved in withholding a complete identification. One
recent exception was a Seventh Circuit decision that criticized a plaintiffs
failed identification of software trade secret claims in sharp language. 48 We
believe that trade secret litigators should educate courts on the reasons why
a complete and specific identification is necessary, and sooner rather than
later.
As to preemption of common law claims under the Uniform Trade
Secret Act, the problem is that trade secret plaintiffs often seek to evade the
defense-friendly aspects of the statute by pleading trade secret claims under
alternative labels such as unfair competition, conversion, and tortious
interference. For the most part, courts have barred such claims under the
UTSA's preemption clause.49 Some trade secret plaintiffs, however, have
been able to fool a small minority of courts that there is such a category as
information that is confidential but that does not rise to the level of a trade
secret.50 This tactic is mere wordplay, an attempt to avoid the statute by
47 See, e.g., Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E.2d 449, 454 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003) (no injunction where plaintiff listed non-secret general categories and pointed to
documents: "Analog invites this Court to acknowledge the existence of trade secrets in
the submitted information without bearing the burden of identifying those trade secrets.
We will not read into Analog's claims specific identification of devices worthy of trade
secret protection when it is Analog's burden to come forward with evidence of such
devices."); Motorola, Inc. v. DBTEL, Inc., 2002 WL 1610982, *16 (N.D. 111. 2002)
(plaintiff failed to identify exact alleged secrets and instead just described generic
categories of technical information); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake Inc., 187
F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Minn. 1999) (general categories of ideas related to brake canister
product such as "detailed drawings of a new Porous canister" insufficient to permit
discovery to go forward).
48 See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002)
(plaintiff claimed that a forty-three page description of "methods and processes" in its
software was enough; court held "No, it isn't," asked "Which aspects are known to the
trade, and which are not?" and noted that "unless the plaintiff engages in a serious effort
to pin down the secrets a court cannot do its job.").
49 A few of the multitude of recent cases ruling in favor of UTSA preemption are
Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(California law); Acrymed, Inc. v. Convatec, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1217-18 (D.Or.
2004) (Oregon law); Glasstech, Inc. v. TGL Tempering Sys., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 722,
730 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (Ohio law).
50 See, e.g., McKesson Med.-Surgical, Inc. v. Micro Bio-Medics, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d
590, 600 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (Michigan law, finding breach of loyalty claim not
preempted on theory that UTSA does not preempt "other confidential information" that
is not a trade secret; later federal court rulings in Michigan have applied UTSA
preemption broadly); Custom Teleconnect, Inc. v. International Tele-Serv., Inc., 254 F.
Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Nev. 2003) (Nevada UTSA); Stone Castle Financial, Inc. v.
Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Virginia
UTSA). The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the minority position in a recent
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using a synonym like "confidential" or "proprietary" instead of the phrase
"trade secret," or to sue over information that is not secret but that the
former employer nonetheless seeks to prevent an employee from using. We
believe that courts should follow the reasoned decisions and recognize this
subjective labeling tactic for what it is, and reject it under the UTSA's
preemption clause. 5' In a UTSA jurisdiction, all tort claims alleging misuse
of nonpublic commercial information should be litigated exclusively under
the statute.
As to allowing a defendant to see the information he or she is
accused of taking, the problem is that even when a trade secret plaintiff
identifies the alleged secrets, it typically does so under an "attorneys' eyes
only" protective order. The accused wrongdoer is thus prohibited from
reviewing the information he or she is accused of already knowing and
taking. This prevents the person best able to refute the accusations from
doing so, such as by pointing out known public domain sources or
establishing his or her prior knowledge of the information before joining the
former employer.
Litigators should insert language into protective orders to allow for
the accused wrongdoer's access to the list of alleged secrets, and should
move to compel such access if the plaintiff refuses. Trade secret plaintiffs
sometimes try to defend such restrictions by claiming that the defendant
will take the information, but such an argument makes little sense given that
the defendant is already being accused of taking and using the exact same
information.
Procedural reforms in trade secret law may be as important as
abolishing non-competition covenants in promoting the development of
innovation communities. Trade secret litigation can be a dangerously
decision over a strong dissent, and without analyzing any of the concerns described
above. See generally Burbank Grease Serv., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781
(Wisc. 2006). This ruling -which guts the UTSA's preemption clause and makes
evading the statute a simple matter of calling information "confidential" instead of
"trade secret" - may be one of the most badly reasoned trade secret cases in American
history. The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the Wisconsin approach soon
afterwards, and followed the majority approach. See generally Mortgage Specialists,
Inc. v. Davey, No. 2005-067, 2006 WL 2060395 (N.H. July 26, 2006).
51 See, e.g., Bliss Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest Brake Bond Co., Inc., 270 F. Supp.
2d 943, 947-49 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (collecting cases and disagreeing with Stone
Castle).; Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789
(W.D. Ky. 2001) (explaining why UTSA preemption covers alternative claims);
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (N.D. II. 2000)
("[Plaintiff] also argues that preemption is improper because the confidential
information taken by [defendant] may not rise to the level of a trade secret. However,
this theory would render [the UTSA's preemption clause] meaningless ... ."); Weins v.
Sporleder, 605 N.W.2d 488, 491-92 (S.D. 2000) ("In analyzing claims for the purpose
of applying the displacement provision, the issue is not what label the plaintiff puts on
their claims. Rather, the court is to look beyond the label to the facts being asserted in
support of the claims.").
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anticompetitive weapon in the hands of a former employer willing to allege
anything and change those allegations frequently in a race to spend a
smaller competitor into the ground.
IV. TEN QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER SCHOLARLY RESEARCH AND
DEBATE
We are confident that an overly-restrictive employee mobility
regime inhibits the development of venture-backed innovation
communities. But every theory should be rigorously debated and tested.
To that end, and in the spirit of developing more meaningful data from
which conclusions could be drawn, we will describe ten questions where
scholarly research would be useful. These questions are as follows:
(1) In jurisdictions where non-competition covenants are legal, what
percentage of high-tech businesses actually include them in employment
contracts?
(2) In jurisdictions where non-competition covenants are legal, and where
skilled employees are subject to them, to what degree are such employees
forced to change fields when they change jobs to avoid a lawsuit? Do such
field changes make less productive use of those employees' skills,
knowledge, and experience?
(3) In jurisdictions where non-competition covenants are legal, how often
do former employers seek to enforce them, and do they represent a profit
source for law firms which advocate their continued existence? What is the
cost of litigation over such covenants to newly-formed businesses?
(4) In jurisdictions where non-solicitation covenants bar former employees
from contacting the customers of their former employers for such period of
time, are such customers aware that their choices have been limited by the
former employer? Are the former employers who use such covenants able
to charge more to such customers as a result of less competition?
(5) When departing employees and/or fiduciaries prepare to compete, do
they typically meet with potential sources of venture funding before
resigning, or afterwards? If the former, does the law of each state permit
such activities, and if not, on what basis?
(6) When former employers sue their former employees, venture capital
firms are sometimes added as a defendant. How frequent are such lawsuits,
how successful are claims against venture capital firms, and what defenses
have venture firms used to defeat such claims?
(7) How frequent is trade secret and non-competition litigation in different
jurisdictions? How much money is spent on lawyers in such cases versus
the approximate economic value of the allegedly secret information?
(8) How many states require trade secret plaintiffs to provide a detailed
identification of the alleged trade secrets early in the case? How many
allow plaintiffs to avoid such identification, and for how long? Are
defendants in such cases prevented from raising defenses such as
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preexisting knowledge or nonsecrecy because they lack the details of each
claim?
(9) How frequently do American technology companies actually track and
record information they consider to be trade secrets? What percentage of
trade secret lawsuits feature claims based on such information, as opposed
to claims drafted by lawyers after the fact to target a former employee?
(10) Do California companies provide less job training than do companies
in jurisdictions that permit non-competition covenants? If not, is there any
validity to the belief that non-competition agreements allow for better or
more job training?
We believe that further research in these areas could shed light on
the hypotheses advanced by Professor Gilson, by this Article, and by other
thinkers questioning the current intellectual property regime. If we are to
develop new legal rules that best fit contemporary economic problems,
assertions should be tested and hypotheses should be challenged. Already
too much law is created by lawyers serving narrow interests and lacking a
broader perspective informed by scholarly attention.
V. CONCLUSION
What we propose for trade secret and non-competition law is that
courts should critically examine whether rules created in different eras truly
serve to protect inventors and benefit the economy, or whether they instead
operate primarily to restrict competition by former employees for no reason
other than to favor their former employers' particular interests.
Non-competition covenants are a leftover from a different time, and
are inconsistent with the rights of former employees to follow their interests
and the development of innovative companies. Trade secret law all too
often permits former employers to pursue after-the-fact, unwritten non-
competition contracts and to bury a start-up rival in litigation costs. We
believe that the law is an important factor affecting the growth of
innovation communities, and that substantial change is needed in the non-
competition and trade secret jurisprudence of almost every state.
